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Dialogism and dialogicality
Throughout historical and cultural development, language and symbolic commu-
nication have been vital for humans’ evolving capacities to conceive themselves
and others as beings who can think, who have knowledge and beliefs, who expe-
rience, use symbols, tell stories, and otherwise. Individuals, groups and societies
create intersubjective bonds, struggle for their social recognition, and evaluate and
judge their intentions and actions. These capacities not only privilege speech and
symbolic communication as vital, but they also have ethical qualities. Although
these capacities have been concerns of humankind throughout history, with the
emergence of the social sciences in the 18th century, they became the subject of
explicit research. Among scholars, Giambattista Vico (1668–1744) emphasised the
inventive power of language and the ethical nature of common sense thinking.
Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1801) viewed language through the power of
self-consciousness and self-realisation. Wilhelm Humboldt (1767–1835) conceived
of language as an organic whole, which is never a finished product but an ever-
changing and dynamic process. We could view such scholars as predecessors of the
concepts of ‘dialogical existence’ and ‘dialogical thinking’, which were later devel-
oped in the post-Hegelian Marburg School, Bakhtin’s dialogism, Vygotsky’s socio-
cultural approach, and American pragmatism. These theoretical influences led,
during the second half of the last century, to the development of a number of
approaches in which dialogue has become the central concept and thus, such
approaches often call themselves ‘dialogical’. At the same time, the emphasis on
dialogue, in which professionals and clients/patients mutually co-construct mean-
ings of their concerns, has become influential in professional practices such as
psychotherapy, family therapy, and the care of people with communication diffi-
culties. Moreover, the focus on mutualities in dialogue has penetrated other
domains of social interactions, for example in education, services and politics.
The main presupposition of dialogical perspectives is that the mind of the Self
and the minds of Others are interdependent in and through the sense-making and
sense-creating of social realities, in interpretations of the past, experiencing the
present and imagining the future. Some dialogical approaches focus on the devel-
opment of peaceful relations among humans, their intersubjective understanding
and aspirations for harmonious relations in daily life, politics and professions;
others explore clashes among participants and groups, and strategies in which
they negotiate their positions. Still others are inspired by the new media and by
various internet genres. All these forms of communication express heterogeneous
dialogues in constantly changing cultures.
In view of so many diverse co-existing dialogical approaches, we need to specify
the kind of dialogicality that concerns us in this special issue. We develop our
conceptual framework of dialogicality as primarily derived from two sources: from
the dialogical philosophies of the 19th and 20th century (e.g. Buber, Bakhtin,
Le´vinas) and from sociocultural psychologies (e.g. Vygotsky, 1986; Valsiner,
2014). Both approaches presuppose that the interdependence between the Self
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and Others forms an ontological unit. This unit takes on different forms, e.g.
collective–individual, the self–social environment, the dissident–political regime
or the individual–institution. In all such cases, each pair forms an unbreakable
unit: one component in each pair defines the other component; if one component
changes, the other also changes. In this process the Self and Others not only co-
construct knowledge and beliefs, but also evaluate one another, make judgements
of their actions, trust and distrust one another, and take and avoid responsibilities.
They are bound by ethical concerns. Their dynamic uniqueness is realised in and
through language and communication, and through multifaceted forms of inter-
action in the construction of meanings in concrete local situations. These capacities
have a strong influence in professional practices such as education, health-related
issues and disability, as well as in politics.
If, as researchers, we presuppose the uniqueness of the Self and Other in com-
munication and in the co-construction of social realities, the question of whether
or not particular empirical methods are suitable for exploring the qualities and
properties of such units then arises. Although this question has been partially
addressed by scholars who call for methodological and analytical approaches
that focus on the Self-in-relation-to-Others, including focus group methods
(Markova´, Linell, Grossen, & Salazar Orvig, 2007), the study of diaries
(Gillespie, Cornish, Aveling, & Zittoun, 2008; Zittoun, 2014), the use of sensitising
questions in interviews (Gillespie & Cornish, 2014) and the analysis of multivoiced-
ness (Aveling, Gillespie, & Cornish, 2015), there is no consistent approach to
taking dialogicality seriously in psychological research. As such, tensions between
the holistic nature of the uniqueness and dynamics of ontologically interdependent
Self–Other units, and the methodological tools with which such units are studied,
remain (Grossen, 2010; Markova´, 2016). Acknowledging the properties of Self–
Other units clearly excludes the use of methods that require the study of many
‘similar’ or ‘same’ cases, as well as studies that consider that people can be studied
outside of the relationships in which they are embedded, such as studies that
deploy only questionnaire methods (Bartory, 2010; Puchalska-Wasyl, 2010). The
uniqueness of the Self–Other unit calls for studying each unit as a whole, in its
singularity, that is, as a ‘single case’, as paradoxical as it may sound.
Single case studies and dialogical single case studies
Beyond a naı¨ve understanding, the study of a ‘single case’ does not only mean the
study of a single person in isolation – although some of these are foundational in
psychology (Rolls, 2014). In the existing literature, the terms ‘case’ and ‘case study’
are used very broadly, and numerous definitions attempt to capture their mean-
ings, or at least some of their pertinent characteristics (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006;
Forrester, 1996; Gerring, 2011; Morgan, 2012; Ragin & Becker, 1992). Among
these, Morgan (2012) applies her perspective of single case studies across all
disciplines, in which the researcher or the practitioner examines a complex singular
event, whether an institution, a town, an industry, or a physical, medical,
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biological or social phenomenon. This very broadly based definition comprises her
insistence on treating the object of study – usually a complex problem or situation –
as a whole, rather than on fragmenting it into elements; it emphasises that the
whole is an open-ended event existing in the real-life environment; it explores
relations among elements of that whole using diverse methods; and it attempts
to tie together different kinds of evidence concerning that case. The fundamental
features of this definition are not only the perspective of wholeness, but equally
important, multidimensional relations among elements of the studied whole, lead-
ing to a coherent pattern of findings. While this definition of single case studies
seems to be applicable across many domains, it is likely that each discipline will
adapt it to its specific purposes. In this special issue, we are concerned with dia-
logical single case studies and therefore the above general definition of single case
studies, although useful, is not sufficient for our purpose. The Self and Others
respond to one another as humans, that is, they evaluate their mutual actions,
they interpret their communication and their intentions. A dialogical single case
study therefore involves ethical and dynamic interdependencies between the Self–
Other(s).
In order to explain the specific nature of dialogical single case studies, let us
consider what makes a difference between a single case study and a dialogical
single case study using an example of a classic single case study of an ‘affluent
worker’ in the study of Goldthorpe, Lockwood, Beckhofer, and Platt (1968–1969).
These researchers hypothesised that when working classes become affluent, they
lose their class identity, and therefore deliberately searched for a case that would
prove their hypothesis. However, their research showed that the hypothesis was
wrong. They found instead that the ‘working class’, having reached ‘middle class’
status, did not dissolve into society without class identity. Flyvbjerg (2006)
describes the case:
Luton, a prosperous industrial centre with companies known for high wages and
social stability—fertile ground for middle-class identity—was selected as a case, and
through intensive fieldwork, the researchers discovered that even here an autonomous
working-class culture prevailed, lending general credence to the thesis of the persis-
tence of class identity. (p. 226)
This single case study had all the features defined by Morgan (2012). It preserved
the idea of wholeness, it was an open-ended event, it explored relations among
elements through intensive fieldwork in a real-life environment, and it provided a
coherent narrative concerning class identity. In this well-designed single case study,
the researchers’ concern was to explore a specific question about the transforma-
tion of the working class into the middle class.
If one wished to re-define this case as dialogical single case study, one would
pose different research questions. For example, in exploring the concept of ‘afflu-
ent worker’, one would foreground questions about Self–Other relations, the
strength of historical and cultural forces, ethical and dynamic relations between
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‘affluent workers’ and their bosses with respect to class identity, or to wages. Such
redefinition of a single case study would still fulfil the criteria set out by Morgan
(2012), but it would, moreover, depict it as a dialogical single case study. In other
words, the researcher has options about how to construct the problem under study
and how to choose appropriate theoretical and empirical concepts. Both kinds of
single case studies, that is, dialogical and non-dialogical, might use the same
research methods, such as intensive and in-depth ethnographic fieldwork, obser-
vations, interviews, and so on, and adapt them for their respective purposes.
Dialogical single case studies, as we define them in this special issue, involve
ethical and dynamic interdependencies between the Self–Other(s). So far, we have
emphasised the ontological nature of the Self–Other interdependence. Let us now
draw attention to the ethical and dynamic features of these interdependencies.
Ethics of dialogical single case studies
Humans act in order to promote what they consider good, just and worthwhile,
even if their judgements differ enormously; what is good for some humans could be
experienced as a misery, injustice, worthlessness, and even terror, for others. Such
normative judgements are based on moral evaluations of actions, intentions and
responsibilities, and not on a neutral processing of information (e.g. Brinkmann,
2010). Moral judgements stem out of ethical principles. In particular, a dialogical
ethics implies the uniqueness of the Self–Other interdependence, which the partic-
ipants in a single case study express in actions, communication and thinking.
Three authors are classically invoked when dialogicality is considered as an
ethics: Martin Buber (1878–1965), Mikhail Bakhtin (1895–1975) and Emmanuel
Le´vinas (1906–1995). The three authors expressed a non-monist, relational under-
standing of the world and especially, humans, developed together with a reflection
on the status of language. Although we cannot enter into a scholarly discussion of
the context of production of the work of these authors, which is deeply related to
dramatic historical and political events that transformed Europe, as well as impor-
tant philosophical debates, we here briefly recount the nuances of their approach
to dialogue as forms of ethics.
Martin Buber developed his reflection in a double anchorage, first in the Jewish
tradition of commenting the Torah and the Talmud, and second, from his parallel
interest in literature and the arts. His little known book translated as I and Thou
(Ich und Du), published in 1923 (Buber, 1953, 1969), presents the core of his
argument: language gives us fundamental terms (Gru¨ndworte) that presuppose a
relation, or are inherently relational as existential experience. Hence, I is funda-
mentally an I–Thou, and goes along with a relation with You apprehended in its
uniqueness and totality. The Other is in principle a human being, but some forms
of relation to non-humans can have comparable intensity – a relation to a tree or a
horse (Buber, 1985, p. 55). Buber, drawing both on mythical and psychological
depictions, reminds us that the child or infant is initially purely in-relation (in the
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womb, tactilely), from which he or she emerges before meeting the Other – You –
while being an I.
If I face a human being as my Thou, and say the primary word I-Thou to him, he is not
a thing among things, and does not consist of things. This human being is not He or
She, bounded from every other He and She, a specific point in space and time within
the net of the world; nor is he a nature able to be experienced and described, a loose
bundle of named qualities. But with no neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou
and fills the heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself. But all
else lives in his light. (Buber, 1953, p. 8)
Hence, the I–Thou relation is an encounter that, temporarily, makes the back-
ground or the situation disappear; at this point, one’s attention is entirely
turned to that unicity or integrity of the Other. Such intense face-to-face relation
can also fade out, the moment at which the You becomes an It: if the Self decom-
poses the Other in its properties, or for his position in networks with others, in time
and space. Hence, states Buber (1953), one cannot be purely and all the time relate
to others as You, he or she has to have an alternate mode of engaging them as It
and as You; but, he adds: ‘And in all the seriousness of truth, hear this: without It
man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man’ (p. 34). In effect, the
world of It is the world of simple, mechanical causalities; in contrast, it is in the I–
Thou relation that the person can be in itself, in subjectivity, in relation to the face
of the Other, and there only, live his or her freedom. The possibility of deciding,
and not obeying simple causalities, is hence dependent on I–Thou (Buber, 1953, p.
51). Hence, for Buber, a dialogical relation is a condition of being human, with free
will and agency; in that sense, the Other is a condition for the realisation of Self as
human.
Mikhail Bakhtin’s work also grew, in a different context, from a double reli-
gious (Christian) and literary commitment. His later work on dialogism in litera-
ture is widely known in psychology – the ideas that language circulates in such
ways, that utterances respond to and anticipate others, and, understood in their
context, carry the echoes and harmonics of other utterances, in other contexts.
Dialogism is in that sense an idea implying answerability, with the idea that every
utterance, every word, answers a previous one and expects a next one; addressed
towards that next word or utterance, it is thus shaped by the answer it anticipates
(Bakhtin, 1981c, p. 280). From this follows the principle of polyphony of dis-
courses and consciousness: ‘each person’s inner world and thought has its stabi-
lized audience that comprises the environment in which reasons, motives, values,
and so on are fashioned’ (Bakhtin/Voloshinov, 1929, in Morris, 1994, p. 58).
These ideas are connected to a deeper sense of answerability, present in
Bakhtin’s earlier work; to escape a world of pure mechanical and contingent
determinations, the person must unite the domains of science, art or life – ‘the
three domains of human culture’ – and in each of them, the person must fully
engage herself. Hence, in the arts: ‘I have to answer with my own life for what
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I have experienced and understood in art, so that everything I have experienced
and understood would not remain ineffectual in my life’ (Bakhtin, 1919, p. 1).
This form of engagement, or accepting to answer with one’s life, appears more
generally in the human act, seen as an unique occurrence and a condition for being.
In his philosophy of the act, Bakhtin enunciated the idea of answerability as
dependent on my uniqueness in the relationship to others or in my action:
And although answerability is always already embedded in one’s relations with other
persons, it remains primarily an “answerability for my own uniqueness, for my own
being” (Bakhtin, 1993, p. 42). For Bakhtin, the answerably performed act is the foun-
dational feature of the self within the self-Other architectonic. (Murray, 2000, p. 138)
Hence, Bakhtin (1981a, 1984) emphasised ethics in terms of responsibility for com-
munication. The most common understanding of responsibility in Bakhtin’s work
refers to ‘non-alibi in being’. Bakhtin (1993) repeatedly insisted that the Self, despite
attempting to excuse him-/herself for actions or for inauthentic communication,
cannot live an alibistic existence, depriving him-/herself of dialogical relations with
Others. In addition,Morson (2010) has referred to a second kind of alibistic existence
in Bakhtin’s work: to non-acting. This kind of alibi refers to situations in which
something drastic happens in the Self’s presence where he/she could help but instead,
the Self pretends that he/she is not aware of that happening.AsMorson (2010) states,
in both kinds of alibi the Self commits amoral error ‘in denying presentness’ (p. 100).
The second case of alibistic existence reminds us of Emmanuel Le´vinas’ (1974/1991)
concept of responsibility of the Self for the one who suffers.
Emmanuel Le´vinas, a philosopher and author of comments of the Talmud, devel-
oped an argument closer to Buber, yet made his primary concern the Other (Poirie´,
1996). The Other is so unique and absolute, that, when I enter into a relation with
him or her, I have the essential responsibility to acknowledge and preserve that
otherness, or the ‘alterity’ of the Other. Le´vinas (1979, p. 50) used the notion of
‘face’ to designate this exteriority of the Other, who preexists and cannot be reduced
to my apprehension of him or her. This uniqueness and fragility is what, in turn,
‘summons me’ (Le´vinas, 1998, p. 146), and calls my responsibility (Prairat, 2012):
I call face that which thus in another concerns the I—concerns me—reminding me,
from behind the countenance he puts on in his portrait, of his abandonment, his
defenselessness and his mortality, and his appeal to my ancient responsibility, as if
he were unique in the world—beloved. (Le´vinas, 1998, p. 227)
For Le´vinas, the Self is responsible for the sufferer in the sense that she or he must
act against evil in the name of Justice. It is the order of Justice, Le´vinas argues, that
sets limits to the Self’s responsibility. Ethics directs the Self to the defence of the
Other, which surpasses the threat that concerns the Self.
In summary, these three understandings of a dialogical ethics emphasise differ-
ent features of Self–Other interdependencies that are relevant to the dialogical
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single case study as well as to the researcher involved in this task. Bakhtin’s
dialogicality is focused on responsibility of the self for communication. It is per-
haps the easiest to apply as care for the infinite dialogicality and polyphony of the
social world and discourses within, and also, to pinpoint the researcher’s own part
played in this flow of responses and demands, echoes and harmonics, before,
during and after the research act. It also puts to the fore the fact that the researcher
is engaged with his or her unique answer to that complex fabric. Buber invites us to
apprehend the persons as well as the nature we meet on a field in their intense
uniqueness – in full encounters, and not to reduce them to ‘it’s in analytical terms.
Le´vinas, eventually, although also concerned with responsibility, conceives it in a
different sense than Bakhtin. He calls us to go one step further in our apprehension
of Others; meeting and acknowledging their uniqueness, we actually become
responsible for them, even more so than for ourselves. In the articles of this special
issue, we shall see that all these kinds of ethics play their roles in the complex
events that the authors attempt to understand.
Chronotope
Just as ethical issues have attained a considerable discussion in the social sciences,
though not always in terms of dialogical ethics, so ‘dynamics’ has been extensively
discussed, though not as a dialogical concept. ‘Dynamics’ refers to change, devel-
opment, movement, transformation, and so on, in and through passing time, and
so it opposes the assumption of stable states of human affairs, fixed positions, and
a lack of change. The relation of ‘dynamics’ to time and temporality can be pur-
sued in a number of directions (e.g. linear time versus non-linear; linear as mechan-
ical time versus more dynamic/fluid; linear as unidirectional/irreversible versus
reversible time; multidirectional, chronometric time versus experiential time).
These directions could be explored historically, culturally or psychologically
(Sim~ao, Guimar~aes, & Valsiner, 2015).
Psychological temporality has usually been explored as a journey of passing
through stages in time, and ‘dynamics’ in this sense is a fundamental concept in
developmental psychology (Smith & Thelen, 2003; Van Geert, 2003; Witherington,
2007). This perspective of temporality is often conceived as a progressive succes-
sion of events, and many studies addressing psychological development represent
time by movements of hands on clocks or by the sequential ticking of biological, or
even of social, time. For example, classical models of the ‘ages of life’ have often
been represented as a succession of immutable steps on an upwards stair from birth
into adulthood, and then downwards into old age and death (for a discussion, see
for instance Zittoun et al., 2013). This conceptualisation has also infused many
theories of development. Jean Piaget, for instance, proposed a dynamic view of
development as relating to core processes of accommodation and assimilation;
eventually, the system would find states of dynamic equilibrium – which he at
times designated as stages (Piaget, 1968). Unfortunately, many of Piaget’s fol-
lowers defined the growth of moral development, of cognitive development,
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perception of responsibility, as well as of physical development in terms of a static
and linear succession of stages, at times represented as steps as in staircases, thus
losing the original understanding of a dynamic equilibrium.
An alternative to linear-scale models can be found in emphases on circles or
spirals. It was the German philosopher George Hegel (1807/1977, 1821/2001) who,
in the early 19th century, formulated the idea of the development of mind as
‘circles returning within themselves’ or as ‘spirals’. He presented an image of devel-
opment as a process of interaction between the mind and its social environment,
during which both partners in interaction gradually transform in and through the
process of active understanding. Drawing on this, Valsiner (2018) has argued that
‘spiral forms are the material encodings of the psychological processes of tension
between open and closed infinities’. He observed that images of spirals dominate
the processes of the developmental sciences and of genetics, as well as the imagi-
nation of individuals, or professionals. However, if they avoid some problems of
the scales, these spiral models do not explicitly account for the spatiality of devel-
opment in society.
Interestingly, Bakhtin’s work offers an alternative route for thinking of dynamic
development through time and space, and one that is instructive for dialogical
single case studies. For him, psychological experience takes place in an uncertain
and unpredictable world; temporality is a fundamental feature of his theory of
dialogue – and of dialogism. Dialogue does not follow any predetermined route,
but there are always infinite possibilities of ‘becoming’, that is, of transforming one
state of discourse into another, even if the change is very small.
Bakhtin stated that he was inspired by Einstein’s and Kant’s ideas about time–
space. He maintained that all lived experience takes place in a specific time and
space, that is, in a chronotope, in which time–space forms an interdependent and
indivisible unit (Bakhtin, 1981b; Bemong et al., 2010; Steinby, 2013). The meaning of
what people say and do is specific to the chronotope in question. Time cannot be
described as linear but rather has a specific psychological function in a particular
condition (or space), and can diversify in multiple ways. However, Bakhtin made it
clear that while he accepted Kant’s evaluations of the importance of time and space,
he did not accept his abstract concepts. Kant considered time and space as tran-
scendental forms of knowledge (ordinary knowledge is concerned with knowledge or
objects; transcendental knowledge is concerned with knowledge of how it is possible
to experience those objects as objects). Instead, Bakhtin considered chronotopes as
processes of concrete artistic relationships as expressed in novels. He analysed chro-
notopes historically, from Greek romance through to the Rabelaisian novel and to
modern literature, focusing specifically on novels by Dostoyevsky. Bakhtin’s histor-
ical analysis is not just an analysis of literature, but it is an account of human
experience in history that takes place in and through different life-styles.
In what follows, we can recall some of the chronotopes identified by Bakhtin. In
Greek romantic novels, space is abstract and is not linked to time. Space is inter-
changeable in sense that the story that takes place in Babylon could just as well
happen in Egypt or Byzantium. In ancient literary products, time and space are
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separate from one another and therefore in essence they are reversible, in the sense
that spaces are interchangeable, and events can be undone under certain circum-
stances: ‘The adventure chronotope is thus characterized by a technical, abstract
connection between space and time, by the reversibility of moments in a temporal
sequence, and by their interchangeability in space’ (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 100; original
emphasis). In commenting on Bakhtin’s analysis of chronotopes, Morson (2010)
has observed that heroes in Greek romance do not behave as agents. Instead,
things happen to them by outside powers or by accident, and the test of Greek
heroes’ resilience is to endure fate and chance.
According to Bakhtin’s analysis, ancient literature did not succeed in generating
literary forms that would be adequate to depict an individual’s private life.
Personal life is adequate only in minor genres, proceeding through schemata and
routines of love, hate, power struggles, wars and peace, but without any specific-
ities of historical time.
In contrast, the second type of chronotope takes place in a real historical
and irreversible time. In contrast to Greek romance in which time and space
were abstract and linked only mechanically, Bakhtin (1984) identified the
‘Bildungsroman’, in which humans emerge as historical agents; here, irreversibility
refers to the consequent open-ended nature of human experience in time:
Nothing conclusive has yet taken place in the world, the ultimate word of the world
and about the world has not yet been spoken, the world is open and free, everything is
still in the future and will always be in the future. (p. 166)
Modern awareness of historical time in social philosophy, as well as in the evolu-
tion (or transformation) of species in the 18th and 19th centuries, was accompa-
nied by political and economic changes. These changes also gave rise to the
modern concept of the Self and the Self’s relations with Others, and so they pre-
pared the conditions for the concept of dialogicality. These new relations became
embedded in the Self’s search for social recognition, which included the struggle
for human rights, dignity and equality. They brought about new ideas of myth of
nations and nationalism; they encouraged interest in history and in other cultures,
and promoted languages as the markers of national identity. They led to imagi-
nations of the past and the future. In this atmosphere, the new literary genre
of Bildungsroman emerged, in which the Self (the hero) underwent moral and
intellectual growth in historical time during his/her life experience. Bakhtin
specifically focused on Goethe’s novels, portraying the hero’s ethical development:
‘One sees the essential and necessary character of man’s historical activity’
(Bakhtin,1979/1986a, p. 38; original emphasis). ‘Bildungsroman’ presents
humans as creative, fully equipped to deal with life experience and its problems.
No longer are humans presented as accepting what happens to them: Bakhtin’s
chronotopic seeing refers to human actions in creative historical time.
While in Goethe’s novels historical time was a fundamental feature of chrono-
tope, it was in Dostoyevsky’s novels that several chronotopes would take place
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simultaneously through the heteroglossia of language. Although human activities
take place in historical time, chronotope is experienced in here-and-now situations
and in heterogeneous encounters through transformations of personal loyalties
and responsibilities. As Bakhtin (1981c) observed about Dostoyevsky’s novels:
In his characters’ language there is a profound and unresolved conflict with another’s
word on the level of lived experience (“another’s word about me”), on the level of ethical
life (another’s judgment, recognition or non-recognition by another) and finally on the
level of ideology (the world views of characters understood as unresolved and unresolv-
able dialogue). What Dostoevsky’s characters say constitutes an arena of never-ending
struggle with others’ words, in all realms of life and creative ideological activity. (p. 349)
Each hero undergoes different chronotopes as he encounters new situations, for
instance in real-life meetings with others, with organisations, and with representatives
of governments.
Bakhtin (1981b, p. 251) concluded his extensive essay about chronotopes by
posing the question about the significance of all these chronotopes. He responded
to his own question by insisting that chronotopes are narratives that generate
representations of different types of plot. While major chronotopes provide a
framework which generate a particular genre, minor or subsidiary chronotopes
may occur in an unlimited number and they have their own motives. Different
chronotopes co-exist, are mutually interwoven, they oppose and contradict one
another: ‘The general characteristic of these interactions is that they are dialogical
(in the broadest use of the word)’ (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 252).
We do not need to interpret Bakhtin’s analysis of literary chronotopes as being
exhaustive in terms of their types and of historical periods, according to which
chronotopes are abstract in ancient literature, while in modern literature they are
dominated by heteroglossia and by profound self-reflexion. Rather, Bakhtin’s
analyses may serve as examples of possible chronotopic types, posing the question
as to whether complex networks of social, political and cultural, as well as per-
sonal, relations in concrete circumstances might reveal other chronotopic types,
and so disregard a specific historical stage. In fact, Bakhtin was deeply aware of the
close relations between historical, social and political events that influence both
individual and societal lives and their reflections in space–time relations, as in
provincial towns in the 19th century (Bakhtin, 1981b, p. 247).
Finally, what is the status of chronotopes in terms of epistemology and ethics?
Concerning the epistemological status of chronotopes, Bakhtin (1981b) accepted
Kant’s concept of time and space in stating that chronotopes are ‘indispensable
forms of any cognition’ (p. 85). However, he explained that in contrast to Kant’s
transcendental forms of cognition, chronotopes are ‘forms of the most immediate
reality’, which, for Bakhtin, is fundamental for artistic creation: ‘the image of man
is always intrinsically chronotopic’. Bakhtin’s ‘image of man’ necessarily raises the
idea of human beings as ethically responsible. This image figures in Bakhtin’s
(1993) work throughout all his writings, from his early book Towards a
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Philosophy of the Act until his last pieces. When we consider chronotopes, the
subject of ethical responsibility becomes particularly important. Chronotopes are
not simply time–space units that can be found in plots or in events, but they are
ethical units that provide an essential ground for social action. In other words,
chronotopes are active forms of experience and of communication, rather than
neutral forms of information processing. Because chronotopes are communicated,
they create meanings, have values and so carry ethical responsibility, which is
revealed in and through concrete and local events in which humans are involved
as co-actors. We can conclude that since for Bakhtin language is a concrete dia-
logical co-action, it is fundamentally chronotopic.
Building on Bakhtin’s ideas, let us characterise chronotope as a dialogical epi-
stemic genre, that is, a style of co-acting in a concrete time–space situation which
results in the transformation of the intersubjective knowledge and experience of
participants. The term ‘genre’ comes from the study of speech and literature, and
Bakhtin (1979/1986b, 1981a) defined genres as epistemological styles of speaking
and communicating. Humans are born into genres that are conventionalised and
institutionalised styles of communicating and acting. They have a double orienta-
tion: towards stability and towards change. While they are relatively stable social
products embedded in social practices and culture, they change through commu-
nicative practices of individuals and groups. They are recognisable through com-
munity precisely because they are institutionalised (Markova´, 2001). In a concrete
time–space situation, a chronotope embodies the irreducible Self–Other unit that is
bound by ethical and dynamic relations. Since a chronotope is a style of co-acting
in a concrete time–space situation, it requires that the researcher explores the
network of elements constituting the whole of the case in question, its major
and subsidiary themes, and their co-existence. Within these, humans have their
freedom and constraints with respect to making choices. They experience uncer-
tainties, fears and hopes; they imagine their past, they live in their present and
expect their possible futures (Bergson,1889/2001).
Chronotope as analytical tool: Ontogenesis, microgenesis
and sociogenesis
How can we use Bakhtin’s conception of chronotope in the social sciences, that is,
beyond the realm of his project? As dialogical or sociocultural psychologists, we
aim to account for ethical and complex realities, that is, to build dialogical case
studies. The notion of chronotope can therefore serve us both as analytical tool
and as communicative tool.
First, when we enter in dialogue with a particular complex reality – a given ‘case
study’, the notion of chronotope can enable us to identify diverse streams or
arrangements of time–space dynamics, at different scales. One possible way of iden-
tifying these scales is to call upon the notions of sociogenesis, ontogenesis and
microgenesis, used in developmental sociocultural psychology (Duveen, 2001;
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Gillespie & Cornish, 2010). Sociogenesis designates the genesis of the social, that is,
social, ideological, political or historical transformations; ontogenesis is about the
development of a single person along her/his course of life; and microgenesis intends
to capture ongoing dialogues and interactions in specific locations, and are thus the
moments through which both socio- and onto-genesis are regenerated.
These three notions usefully capture different scales of change and their mutual
relations – usually, sociogenesis is slower than interactions, unless of course there is
a revolution or a war. However, these notions fail to account for the necessarily
situated nature of these dynamics, which the notion of chronotope allows us to
introduce. Hence, the notion of chronotope could become an analytical tool to
identify, in the complex dynamic whole of a case, ‘channels’ of transformation, in
time and space, at different scales. We could thus for instance consider that the
case as a whole – say, an institution – evolves according to a first chronotope, a
certain time–space arrangement (which would correspond to a spatialisation of
sociogenesis), that some of its subparts evolve according to other time–space
dynamics (for instance by following the trajectory in time and space of one specific
person coming through that institution), and also, that some relations within the
whole have their own chronotope at a microgenetic scale (for instance, by follow-
ing a specific teacher–student dynamic moving across time and space). In that
sense, the notion of chronotope would be an analytical tool to follow time–
space trajectories at different scales.
At the same time, through the notions of sociogenesis, microgenesis and onto-
genesis, we can identify different implications for time and specifically, for its ir/
reversibility, as it relates to different chronotopes. First, sociogenesis can include
two types of chronotopes. On the one hand, mythical time evolves sociogenetically,
although it implies suspended, interchangeable, that is in Bakhtin’s words, revers-
ible, time and spaces. Certain belief systems and ideologies can equally be detached
from specific time–spaces, or act as if they were (think for instance, of new
evidence-based interventions, which are supposedly by their nature transferable,
or the promise of ‘the end of history’ of socialism). On the other hand, sociogenesis
also includes the unfolding of history, and in this sense, time is irreversible and
attached to specific spaces: once a war has happened it cannot be undone (as in
Anisov’s (2001) ‘broom of time’, quoted in Zittoun et al., 2013, p. 103), and neither
can the consequent chains of events and destruction be revoked.
Second, at a microgenetic level, chronotopes occur through specific encounters
and interactions. Here, of course, time is objectively irreversible; actions cannot be
undone, hands unshaken, or nails unhammered. However, some microgenetic events
can be recurrent, as in routine-based chronotopes. Because of their repetitive nature,
these can be experienced by specific persons as ‘the same’ or as anchored in an
endless, reversible time; hence, the dullness of repetitive jobs or actions is epitomised
in Prometheus. Similarly, microgenetic events can be recurrent in the sense that
spoken words may carry weight that carries into new interactions.
Third, ontogenesis presents an interesting combination of possible chronotopes
and relations to time and space. Again, the idea of the Bildungsroman here rejoins a
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developmental understanding of a person’s course of life; through experience,
indeed, people try situations, fail, learn new modes of action, transform their iden-
tities, develop new understanding – time is here irreversible: experiences cannot be
un-lived. However, psychology has also taught us that experienced time can be much
more flexible and bendable. Dreams reveal the reversibility of psychic life: there, we
can experience new combinations of events or feelings long gone, linked to the
present or attached to our fear of the future. Similarly, our emotional life also
often brings into the present fears from childhood or aspects of our identities that
are in principle no longer existent. Psychoanalysis thus made us aware of the lability
and reversibility of psychic time (especially of the unconscious) (Green, 2000a,
2000b). Hence, at all levels of socio-, micro- and onto-genesis, tensions between
the irreversibility and the reversibility of time can co-exist, at times with tragic
consequences.
Based on such an analytical distinction, and also following Bakhtin’s reflection on
literature, we could elaborate on specific forms of accounting for these chronotopes.
Hence, the concept of social representation may usefully be used to describe socio-
historical chronotopes, but not the life-course of a person. In dialogical single case
studies that are concerned with ethical and dynamic interdependencies between the
Self–Other(s), that therefore capture the ‘wholeness’ of cases, and that by their
nature are open-ended, chronotope is an analytical tool to understand multiple
time–space trajectories at different scales, in and through which ethical co-actors
relate to one another. Chronotopes also serve as a communicative tool, insofar as
the means through which we account for them could become guides for writing up
and communicating about case studies. Indeed, as social, cultural or dialogical
psychologists, we may have to account for the transformations of countries, insti-
tutions, interactions or people; but the style of writing about these needs to be
adjusted to the specific ‘scale’ of time–space dynamics, and so the specific concepts
(e.g. for Bakhtin, Bildungsroman) used to account for these chronotopes. This then
opens the question of the ‘genre’ of knowledge (in the literary sense of the term) we
produce through the identification of chronotopes in dialogical case studies, and so
too the question of how that knowledge could become general, and indeed, what
that means, as we will see below.
Chronotopes and generalisation in dialogical case studies:
Towards new knowledge genres
It is clear that dialogical single case studies so defined have unique criteria that
pertain to an ethics of engagement, of answerability, and of responsibility on the
one hand, and streams of time–space dynamics with specific scales on the other.
These criteria have implications not only for how one defines single cases, but also
for how one researches, evaluates, and thinks and contributes with them. As
researchers, we do not stand outside of the dialogical dynamics we have described
in this paper. Entering in dialogue with a case that is characterised by specific time–
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space dynamics of ethical co-actors, the researcher is also bound by ethical con-
cerns, she or he engages with Others, and is responsible to them. Hence, the ethics
of Self–Other interdependencies that impel the researcher to frame their questions
in terms of chronotopes are also central to what the researcher her or himself does,
and to what she or he can do, with the case so built, which has implications for the
mode of generalisation, if any, she or he pursues. This is true in two senses. First,
the researcher–researched relation comes to constitute a subpart of the case. This is
obvious, although variations will be found between different case studies (whether
the researcher–participant relation moves over time, or the trajectory of the
researcher is itself important, and so on) (Hviid & Beckstead, 2011; Zadeh,
2017; Zittoun, 2017). Second, the researcher who studies the complex dynamic
whole of a case through chronotopes reveals their commitment to a specific epi-
stemic genre. From this commitment the question of what can be known from a
dialogical single case study then arises: a question that has most often been framed
within the literature as the question of generalisation. As we will see, this question
is perhaps not appropriate for dialogical single case studies.
As with cases so defined by Morgan (2012), Valsiner (2019) and others (see, e.g.
Flyvbjerg, 2006), it is first evident that generalisation from samples to populations,
or statistical generalisation, when applied to dialogical single cases, makes little
sense. The researcher motivated to study dynamic and ethical interdependent units
does not approach the construction of their case using a method of sampling that
treats the Self as something other than an ethical being from whose unique com-
munication with Others something important can be known (see also Markova´,
2016). Moreover, dialogical case studies are not underpinned by the commitment
to prediction that is requisite to statistical forms of generalisation, and which
clearly does not involve an understanding of Self–Other dynamics in specific
time–space. Further, questions about how to statistically generalise from case
study research, which derive from a focus on an independent Self, rather than
the actual subject matter of whole cases, not only fail to align with the ontological
presuppositions of dialogical approaches, but also do not account for the fact that
such research generates insights not only from human participants but also from
the sociocultural environment (see also Valsiner, 2019).
A number of researchers have conversely suggested that we should generalise
from single case studies to theories rather than to populations. Two of the most
outspoken authors to argue this, Flyvbjerg (2006) and Yin (2012, 2013), describe
the distinction between generalisation to populations and to theories as the dis-
tinction between formal or statistical generalisation on the one hand, and analyt-
ical generalisation, on the other. Analytical generalisation is of course not novel. It
is in fact quite common for qualitative researchers to claim that they are engaging
in this task through ‘grounded theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967): the generation of
theory through the sampling strategy of ‘theoretical saturation’. In basic terms,
theoretical saturation refers to the point at which no new information is gained
from conducting further interviews, observations, and so on, and from which the
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researcher can identify the specific ‘properties’ of the category of interest (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967, p. 61).
Although in its original formulation, theoretical saturation was conceived as
relating to the ‘never-ending process of generating theory’ (Glaser & Strauss, 1967,
p. 40), in much of the literature to date this aspect has been obfuscated by an
overemphasis on saturation through empirical sampling, marking the elevation of
a tool to a theory (Valsiner, 2006). Even scholars who seek to use more nuanced
approaches, such as that of corpus construction (see Bauer & Aarts, 2000), uphold
some idea of there being a point at which sampling produces nothing new. In other
words, despite the fact that this approach determines theory-building as ‘open-
ended’, it fails to conceptualise the subject matter of research as equally dynamic.
Rather, it treats the case at some point as ‘closed’.
So conceived, generalising to theories cannot be the basis upon which general-
isation from dialogical single case studies can be defended. This is not only because
the researcher using grounded theory does not generally identify their case as
dynamic, but also because it is not clear that claims to general theories made on
this basis align with the ethical nature of dialogical single cases. In overemphasis-
ing sampling, claims to theoretical saturation have most often relied upon
researchers’ claims to further data collection providing ‘informational redundancy’
(Sandelowski, 2008), which in itself relies upon researchers listening to participants
to ascertain whether or not their stories generate ‘redundant’ information. This
amounts to researchers seeking to be bored by participants. In other examples
using grounded theory, researchers ‘go beyond’ saturation on ‘ethical grounds’,
for instance in studies in which people want to participate (they want to be listened
to, recognised, and so on), and so researchers facilitate this, even though they
assume that doing so will not generate new insights (see, e.g. Saunders et al.,
2018). In these, less typical, examples, research practices ostensibly contravene
the principles of theoretical saturation in order to uphold Self–Other researcher–
participant relations, yet also fail to genuinely engage with the Other.
A different proposal for generalising to theory was presented by Dennis
Bromley (1986), who argues that ‘[w]e do not infer things “from” a case study;
we impose a construction, a pattern on meaning, “onto” the case . . .’ (p. 290). The
construction of a pattern on the basis of a single case study was more recently
suggested by Tania Zittoun (2017), and can also be traced to Kurt Lewin’s defence
of single case studies (Lewin, 1948; Lewin & Lippitt, 1938). For Zittoun (2017),
analytical generalisation takes the form of Peircean abduction. In such approaches,
the open-ended nature of the case, and the case study, are maintained. However,
general approaches to generalising to theory seem to be at odds with our emphasis
on chronotopes. This is because a general theory (singular) may not preserve the
specific ‘scale’ of time-space dynamics in different single cases. In such approaches,
questions about the genre of knowledge produced through the study of single cases
are generally also not addressed (but see Zittoun, 2019).
The discussion in this paper seems to re-orient our thinking: away from gener-
alisation from case studies, towards generating knowledge through cases, insofar as
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we have described dialogical single case studies as concerned with dynamic and
ethical interdependencies that can be accounted for in the identification of chro-
notopes, and suggested that chronotope may be characterised as a dialogical epi-
stemic genre. Knowledge genres or epistemic genres have been discussed in relation
to social epistemology in general (Berkenkotter & Tuckin, 1993), to narratives in
medicine (Pomata, 2014) and to single case studies (Morgan, 2012). Although
Morgan does not refer to Bakhtin, by ‘epistemic genre’ she means a thinking
style or a way of thinking. In terms of case studies, this for Morgan (2014)
means the re-situation of knowledge, or the transfer of locally generated knowl-
edge to other areas. She suggests three strategies in particular, which she calls
bridges and stepping stones (from one local knowledge to another local case),
ladders (from one local knowledge to many other cases) and exemplars (which
establish local as typical and transfer it to many other similar cases).
In contrast to non-dialogical single case studies, the researcher of dialogical
single cases must not only identify strategies of resituating knowledge, but they
must raise questions about resituating knowledge and experience through chrono-
topes, and they must pose questions about the strength of ethical engagement of
(and to) participants.
In this special issue, we shall see that different answers to the question of how to
resituate knowledge in and from dialogical single case studies emerge. In all of the
papers, we see how the construction of a dialogical single case study takes shape. In
many, we see the researcher’s primary concern with, and commitment to, her
participants; this is for instance a priority for Hviid’s (2019) intervention in a
region that wanted to change kindergarten practices in Denmark, and the
approach developed by Cornish (2019a) in working with the communities affected
by the Grenfell Tower fire in London. Some of the papers in this issue foreground
dialogical practices in the field, as for instance Coultas (2019), whose contribution
explores whether an educational intervention in Tanzania can acknowledge the
dialogicality of participants at all, and Markova´ and Novaes (2019), who consider
a variety of professional practices. Others foremost focus on the analytical tools
with which dialogical single case studies can be articulated, such as Zadeh and
Cabra (2019) who reflect on dialogical exemplars, and Zittoun (2019), who builds a
regional case study and mainly uses a dialogical analytical principle. In fact, doing
so, all of the papers reflect upon the implications of dialogism as a theoretical
frame, and the epistemological approach and ethical concerns of dialogical single
case studies (see Cornish, 2019b for a general discussion). Collectively, the papers
of this issue serve as examples of the process of resituating knowledge within a
dialogical epistemic genre, and are therefore intended, as reflections, to be as open-
ended as the cases they describe.
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